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SUPRANATIONAL RULINGS AS
JUDGMENTS AND PRECEDENTS

ERNEST A. YOUNG*
Why do domestic courts routinely enforce arbitral awards
rendered by tribunals operating abroad, and yet frequently refuse to
defer to the decisions rendered by supranational judicial bodies?
Scholars of international and foreign relations law have increasingly
engaged the “interjurisdictional problem” concerning the relationship
between domestic and supranational courts,1 but this literature
frequently pays relatively little attention to the burgeoning
2
phenomenon of international arbitration. Although contributors to
this Symposium have debated whether international arbitration is
really crowding out traditional litigation as the most important
method for resolving transnational disputes,3 there is no doubt that
international arbitration is a highly successful phenomenon. Nor can
one deny the existence of a marked disparity between the receptivity
of domestic courts to transnational arbitral awards, on the one hand,
and the considerably greater skepticism with which such courts greet

* Professor of Law, Duke Law School. This essay is part of the Duke Journal of Comparative &
International Law’s symposium on “Public and Private Law in the Global Adjudicative System,”
held on Feb. 15, 2008. I am grateful to the Journal for the opportunity to participate, to John
Gotanda, Ralf Michaels, and my co-panelists Mark Movsesian and Melissa Waters for helpful
comments, to Erin Blondel for excellent research assistance, and to Allegra Young on general
principle.
1. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of
National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029 (2004); Jenny Martinez, Towards an International
Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429 (2003); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997). For my
own contribution to this literature, see Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a
Globalizing Judicial System, 54 DUKE L.J. 1143 (2005) [hereinafter Young, Institutional
Settlement].
2. There are, of course, exceptions. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts,
International Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 675, 700 (2003)
(considering the arbitral model as one of several different models for the relationship between
domestic and supranational courts).
3. Compare Thomas E. Carbonneau, Commercial Peace and Political Competition in the
Crosshairs of International Arbitration, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 308 (2008) (asserting that
arbitration is supplanting traditional litigation), with Christopher A. Whytock, Litigation,
Arbitration, and the Transnational Shadow of the Law, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 447 (2008)
(questioning the actual dominance of arbitration).
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the decisions of supranational courts like the International Court of
Justice (ICJ).
Some have suggested that this disparity can be traced to a
distinction between “public” law, which “regulat[es] the relations of
individuals with the government and the organization and conduct of
4
the government itself,” and “private” law, which is “concerned with
5
private persons, property, and relationships.” To be sure, the great
bulk of international arbitral awards have concerned private
contractual disputes, and these sorts of awards seem to engender the
6
least resistance to their enforcement. The most prominent domestic
decisions refusing to defer to supranational courts, on the other hand,
have come in the public law area.7 But the Legal Realists taught
American lawyers to be skeptical of sharp distinctions between the
“public” and “private” spheres, and it is not hard to trace the public
implications of even purely contractual norms being developed in
supranational arbitral rulings. I want to suggest a different ground for
distinction in this brief essay: The commercial arbitral awards that are
so readily enforced by domestic courts are simply judgments, which
do not implicate the law declaring functions of courts. Domestic
courts have been considerably more skeptical, however, when asked

4. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/public%20law (last visited Feb. 22, 2008); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1230 (6th ed. 1990)
(defining “public law” as “[a] general classification of law, consisting generally of constitutional,
administrative, criminal, and international law, concerned with the organization of the state, the
relations between the state and the people who compose it, the responsibilities of public officers
to the state, to each other, and to private persons, and the relations of states to one another”).
5. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, supra note 4; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY,
supra note 4, at 1196 (defining “private law” “as used “in contradistinction to public law,” as
“that part of the law which is administered between citizen and citizen, or which is concerned
with the definition, regulation, and enforcement of rights in cases where both the person in
whom the right inheres and the person upon whom the obligation is incident are private
individuals”). The mission statement for the conference panel to which this essay contributes,
for example, asks “Why are many states seemingly not as receptive to the decisions of public
international courts as they are to private arbitral decisions?” Ralf Michaels, Opening
Remarks, Public and Private Law in the Global Adjudication System – Three Questions to the
Panelists, 2008 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law Symposium, in 18 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 253 (2008).
6. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (“[A] contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to
settle by arbitration thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable . . . .”); see, e.g., Galt v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 376 F.2d 711, 714 (7th Cir.
1967) (applying the Federal Arbitration Act to private contract claims); Siemens Westinghouse
Power Corp. v. Dick Corp., 293 F. Supp 2d 344, 346-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (same).
7. See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2683 (2006) (refusing to defer to
the International Court of Justice’s interpretation of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations).

YOUNG_FMT3.DOC

2008]

10/15/2008 2:25:32 PM

SUPRANATIONAL RULINGS

479

to defer to the precedential effect of supranational decisions or the
interpretive authority of the supranational courts that issue them.
I also want to argue that this disparity in treatment, when viewed
as one between the force of supranational decisions as judgments and
as precedents, makes eminent good sense. The law-declaring
function of courts implicates the interests of autonomy and
accountability that lie at the heart of any credible notion of
sovereignty. Domestic courts are properly hesitant to cede this
function to supranational bodies, especially when the democratic
legitimacy (and possibly the procedural transparency and integrity) of
those tribunals is dubious. By contrast, the enforcement of a
judgment, without more, typically settles the dispute between the
parties without resolving the rights of parties not before the court.
Particularly where the parties have already consented to the arbitral
forum, there are few sovereign concerns to outweigh the efficiency
gains to be had from barring relitigation.
Even when we are concerned with the force of foreign rulings as
judgments rather than precedents, however, those rulings do not
automatically have domestic force. Foreign arbitral awards are
binding domestically because Congress has ratified the treaty
governing such awards and incorporated that treaty into domestic
statutes. Where such legislative implementation is absent, courts
have been—and ought to be—far more hesitant to accord domestic
force to foreign and supranational judgments.
This essay has two parts. Part One develops the puzzle of
domestic deference to foreign decisions in arbitral cases and
skepticism of such decisions in “public” cases. Part Two rejects
accounts of this distinction grounded in a sharp dichotomy between
public and private, and advances an alternative account grounded in
two other variables: the distinction between judgments and
precedents, and the primary role of Congress in determining when
foreign rulings will have domestic force. I suggest some broader
implications of this analysis in the Conclusion.
I. A PUZZLING DISPARITY?
Many observers have remarked on the unfortunate disconnect
between public and private international law. That disconnect can
distort our perceptions of the nascent global judicial system. On the
public side, potential intrusions by supranational judicial bodies—e.g.,
the International Court of Justice or the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Appellate Body—into domestic litigation seem unusual and
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suspect, despite the frequency with which foreign decisions impact
domestic entities and disputes in the context of commercial
arbitration. On the other side of the coin, the success of commercial
arbitration at performing certain functions in certain kinds of disputes
may tempt private international lawyers to underestimate the
difficulty of incorporating supranational decisions that play more
public roles into the domestic legal system. I ultimately argue here
that the international arbitration model should not influence, to any
great extent, the ways in which domestic courts treat supranational
decisions that purport to declare the law rather than simply resolve
disputes. But that is not to deny that we can learn a great deal from
the comparison. There is a significant disparity between the
treatment of foreign decisions in the arbitration and public law
contexts, and unearthing the reasons for it can help us better
understand the enterprise of transnational decisionmaking in each
context.
A. Domestic Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
Arbitral awards originating outside the American legal system
are routinely enforced, in keeping with a more general enthusiasm for
8
arbitration in the domestic legal system. Under the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
9
Awards, commonly known as the New York Convention, domestic
courts apply a highly deferential standard of review. “The Convention
does not give courts the power to refuse enforcement of an award
because it disagrees with the substantive outcome on the merits”;10
rather, courts are obliged to enforce the award unless one of the
narrow grounds for refusal specified in the treaty is met.11 Both
8. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (striking down a California
law restricting arbitration agreements and declaring “a national policy favoring arbitration”);
Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse: Judicial Review of Arbitration
Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 60 (1997) (“The judiciary’s attitude toward arbitration has
undergone a startling transformation” that “has assured the liberal interpretation and
enforcement of arbitration agreements” and “has disabled public policy objections to the
arbitration of certain statutory claims.”).
9. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
10. Howard A. Ellins & Christopher H. Withers, Judicial Deference to the Authority of
Arbitrators to Interpret and Apply Federal Antitrust Laws, 12 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 387, 397
(2001).
11. See generally Alford, supra note 2, at 700-04; Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation,
Confirmation of Foreign Arbitral Award Under Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 194 A.L.R. FED. 291 (2004).
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Congress and the federal courts have enthusiastically assimilated this
treaty obligation into domestic law.
Congress has explicitly
incorporated the New York Convention into the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA),12 and the Court has suggested that the FAA’s general
policy favoring arbitration is even more compelling in the
13
international context.
The New York Convention appears to envision that the courts of
the country in which the arbitration takes place will furnish the
primary check on arbitral proceedings. As Judge Wiener has
explained, the Convention “mandates very different regimes for the
review of arbitral awards (1) in the countries in which, or under the
law of which, the award was made, and (2) in other countries where
14
recognition and enforcement are sought.” The former courts have
“primary jurisdiction” over the award, and the Convention “does not
restrict the grounds on which primary-jurisdiction courts may annul
an award.”15 Those courts thus “have much broader discretion to set
aside an award” than courts in other nations, which exercise a
“secondary” jurisdiction over actions to enforce the award.16
Secondary jurisdiction courts may refuse recognition only on one of
17
several specific bases set forth in the Convention.

12. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (2006).
13. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1974) (citations omitted):
A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall
be litigated and the law to be applied is, therefore, an almost indispensable
precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to
any international business transaction. Furthermore, such a provision obviates
the danger that a dispute under the agreement might be submitted to a forum
hostile to the interests of one of the parties or unfamiliar with the problem area
involved.
A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce an international
arbitration agreement would not only frustrate these purposes, but would invite
unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to secure tactical
litigation advantages.
14. Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 335
F.3d 357, 364 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126
F.3d 15, 23 (2d Cir. 1997)).
15. Id. at 368.
16. Id.
17. Secondary jurisdiction courts do not, however, appear to be bound by the outcome of
challenges to an award in the country of primary jurisdiction. Such courts may, for instance,
enforce awards held unenforceable in the primary country, and they may also decline
recognition, notwithstanding the primary jurisdiction court’s refusal to vacate an award, if the
Convention’s criteria are met. See id. at 367-68. “By allowing concurrent enforcement and
annulment actions, as well as simultaneous enforcement actions in third countries, the
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When the prevailing party in a foreign arbitration seeks
enforcement of the award in a domestic court, Chapter V of the
Convention provides several primarily procedural and quite narrow
grounds upon which a domestic court may refuse to recognize the
18
award. Optional reservations to the Convention, both of which were
incorporated in the U.S. Senate’s ratification of the agreement,19
restrict the Convention’s coverage to awards made in other signatory
countries and that arise out of commercial relationships. The most
open-ended grounds for nonrecognition, however, are found in
Section Two of Article V, which permits nonenforcement by a
domestic court if “[t]he subject matter” of the dispute “is not capable
Convention necessarily envisions multiple proceedings that address the same substantive
challenges to an arbitral award.” Id. at 367.
18. Specifically, the domestic court may deny recognition if:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law
applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid
under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication
thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice
of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was
otherwise unable to present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within
the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters
beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the
decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not
so submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters
submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not
in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was
not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place;
or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside
or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the
law of which, that award was made.
New York Convention, supra note 9, art. V(1).
19. Id. art. I(3):
When signing, ratifying, or acceding to this Convention, or notifying extension
under article X hereof, any State may on the basis of reciprocity declare that it
will apply the Convention to the recognition and enforcement of awards made
only on the territory of another Contracting State. It may also declare that it
will apply the Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships,
whether contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under the
national law of the State making such Declaration.
The reservation restricting coverage to international awards arising out of commercial
relationships is implemented in the FAA at 9 U.S.C. § 202 (providing that “[a]n agreement or
award arising out of [a commercial] relationship which is entirely between the citizens of the
United States shall be deemed not to fall under the Convention” unless it has some “reasonable
relation with one or more foreign states”).
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of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country,” or if
“[t]he recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to
20
the public policy of that country.” American courts have generally
construed these exceptions narrowly in order to promote the general
21
policy favoring arbitration of disputes. The public policy exception,
in particular, has eroded significantly over the years.22
A good example of the narrowness of this exception in practice is
the Second Circuit’s leading decision in Parsons & Whittemore
Overseas Co., Inc. v. Société Générale De L’Industrie du Papier
23
Overseas, an American company, contracted with
(RAKTA).
RAKTA, an Egyptian corporation, to build a paperboard mill in
Alexandria, Egypt. In 1967, five years into the contract, the Egyptian
government severed diplomatic relations with the United States in
connection with the Arab-Israeli Six Day War and expelled all
Americans from Egypt except those who could obtain a special visa.24
When Overseas abandoned the contract, litigation ensued concerning
whether termination was permitted by a force majeur clause in the
agreement. RAKTA ultimately prevailed before an arbitral tribunal
and sought to enforce the award in the American courts. Overseas
opposed enforcement of the arbitral award, primarily on the ground
that its abandonment of the contract was consistent with United
States public policy, as indicated by the U.S. Agency for International
Development’s withdrawal of financial support for the construction
project. The Second Circuit, however, emphasized that “[t]he general
pro-enforcement bias informing the [New York] Convention . . .
points toward a narrow reading of the public policy defense.”25 The
Court of Appeals thus concluded that “[e]nforcement of foreign
arbitral awards may be denied on this basis only where enforcement
would violate the forum state’s most basic notions of morality and
justice.”26
Unsurprisingly, given this legal framework, one finds many,
many cases enforcing foreign arbitral rewards without any significant

20. New York Convention, supra note 9, art. V(2).
21. See Alford, supra note 2, at 701-04.
22. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 8, at 63-76 (chronicling the erosion of the public policy
defense in arbitration cases).
23. 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
24. Id. at 972.
25. Id. at 973.
26. Id. at 974.
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inquiry into the underlying merits of the dispute.27 The regime is thus
one of extraordinary deference, largely comparable to the “full faith
and credit” that American domestic courts owe to judgments
rendered by the courts of their sister states.28 As the next section
demonstrates, however, American domestic courts are not always so
receptive to foreign law in general and to the decisions of
supranational courts in particular.
B. Reception of Foreign Law and Supranational Court Decisions
Notwithstanding the deferential treatment accorded to foreign
arbitral awards under the New York Convention, American
jurisprudence has recently been marked by heated debates about the
propriety of citing foreign decisions and legal practices, and by
considerable skepticism toward the decisions of supranational
tribunals. American courts have long taken account of foreign
29
practice and decisions, but the Supreme Court has sparked
controversy by prominently citing foreign sources in a string of cases
overruling prior precedent and extending the scope of constitutional
rights to sexual privacy and against cruel and unusual punishment.30
The debate has spilled over into the world outside the courts, as

27. E.g., Land, Air & Sea Transp. v. El Nasr Mining Co., No. 06-13482, 2008 WL 612732, at
*2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2008); Suraleb, Inc. v. Prod. Ass’n “Minsk Tractor Works,” No. 06-3496,
2008 WL 294839, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2008); China Three Gorges Project Corp. v. Rotec
Indus., No. 04-1510, 2005 WL 1813025, at *3 (D. Del. Aug. 2, 2005); Rintin Corp. v. Domar,
Ltd., 374 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1169-71 (S.D. Fla. 2005); Shanghai Foodstuffs Imp. & Exp. Corp. v.
Int’l Chemical, Inc., No. 99-3320, 2004 WL 213019, at *1-3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2004); Compagnie
D’Enterprises CFE, S.A. v. Republic of Yemen, 180 F. Supp. 2d 12, 14 (D.D.C. 2001); Empresa
Construtora Context Limitada v. Iseki, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1023-26 (S.D. Cal. 2000);
Trans Chemical Ltd. v. China Nat’l Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp., 978 F. Supp. 266, 308-10 (S.D.
Tex. 1997).
28. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
29. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1
(2006); Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign
Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47
WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (2005).
30. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986), and concluding that prohibitions on homosexual sodomy violated the constitutional
right to privacy grounded in the Due Process Clause); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
(overruling Penry v. Lynaugh, 402 U.S. 302 (1989), and concluding that executing mentally
retarded individuals offends “evolving standards of decency” embodied in the Eighth
Amendment). For a sampling of the academic debate, see Agora: The United States
Constitution and International Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 42 (2004) (articles by T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Roger P. Alford, Harold Hongju Koh, Gerald L. Neuman, and Michael D. Ramsey);
Comment, The Debate over Foreign Law in Roper v. Simmons, 119 HARV. L. REV. 103 (2005)
(essays by Vicki Jackson, Jeremy Waldron, and Ernest A. Young).
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Members of Congress have even gone so far as to introduce
legislation forbidding the citation of foreign materials in
31
constitutional adjudication.
32
The leading case here is Roper v. Simmons, in which the
Supreme Court overruled its prior decision in Thompson v.
33
Oklahoma and struck down the application of state death penalty
laws to capital murderers who committed their crimes before reaching
the age of eighteen. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Roper
relied significantly upon the fact that few foreign jurisdictions permit
34
the imposition of the death penalty in similar circumstances. That
reliance drew a stinging rebuke from Justice Scalia, who insisted in
dissent that “the basic premise of the Court’s argument—that
American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world—
ought to be rejected out of hand.”35 Although Justice Scalia’s position

31. See H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004) (“Expressing the sense of the House of
Representatives that judicial determinations regarding the meaning of the laws of the United
States should not be based on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions unless
such judgments, laws, or pronouncements inform an understanding of the original meaning of
the laws of the United States.”). The resolution did not pass, but it did attract sixty co-sponsors.
See id.; see also Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court, the Law of Nations, and Citations of
Foreign Law: The Lessons of History, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1335, 1342-43 (2007) (describing efforts
by members of Congress to limit the judiciary’s use of foreign law).
32. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
33. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
34. See id. at 575 (“Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate
punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United States
is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death
penalty.”). Justice Kennedy acknowledged that “[t]his reality does not become controlling, for
the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains [the Court’s] responsibility.” Id. But
he noted that “the Court has referred to the laws of other countries and to international
authorities as instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel
and unusual punishments.’” Id. (citations omitted). Foreign law comparison was, in fact, quite
important to the Court’s reasoning. See generally Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the
Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148 (2005) [hereinafter Young, Foreign Law].
35. Roper, 543 U.S. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting references to foreign law in invalidating state
sodomy laws). Tellingly, Justice Scalia noted that the justices in the majority were unwilling to
embrace foreign views on libel law, abortion, or separation of church and state—all areas in
which the U.S. Constitution imposes unusually broad restrictions on government. Roper, 543
U.S. at 624-27. “To invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s own thinking, and ignore it
otherwise,” he observed, “is not reasoned decisionmaking, but sophistry.” Id. at 627. Justice
Scalia expounded his views in more depth in a public debate with Justice Breyer on the subject
at American University. Justices Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, Discussion at the American
University Washington College of Law: Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions
(Jan. 13, 2005) (transcript available at http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/1D265343BDC2189785256B810071F238/1F2F7DC4757FD01E85256F890068E6E0?OpenDocu
ment).
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was in the minority in Roper and other recent cases, there is reason to
believe that the two justices appointed since those cases were
decided—Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito—may
well share his skepticism.36
A similar skepticism was on full display in Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon,37 which concerned the degree of deference that domestic
courts should pay to the interpretation of an international treaty by
the International Court of Justice. Sanchez-Llamas involved two
consolidated appeals under the Vienna Convention on Consular
38
Article 36 of the VCCR requires signatory
Relations (VCCR).
nations to inform foreign nationals arrested for crimes that they have
a right to contact their consulate.39 Mario Bustillo, the non40
eponymous petitioner in Sanchez-Llamas, was a Honduran national
arrested, tried, and convicted of murdering a man in Virginia.
Although Virginia authorities failed to notify Mr. Bustillo of his rights
under the VCCR, Bustillo failed to raise this issue until he sought
collateral review in state court. The state courts accordingly held
Bustillo’s claim “procedurally barred” by his failure to raise the issue
at trial or on direct review.41 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed,

36. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 200-01 (2005)
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.) (expressing “concern . . . about the use of foreign law as
precedent”); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be Associate
Justice of the United States Supreme Court: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 370-71 (2006) (statement of Samuel A. Alito, Jr.), available at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congr-ess/senate/pdf/109hrg/25429.pdf (“[T]here are situations in
litigation that come up in Federal court when it is legitimate to look to foreign law, but I don’t
think it’s helpful in interpreting our Constitution.”). Perhaps significantly, Justice Kennedy did
not cite foreign law in the Court’s latest Eighth Amendment decision, Kennedy v. Louisiana,
128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
37. 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006).
38. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S.
261.
39. Id. art. 36(1)(b).
40. The Court consolidated Bustillo v. Johnson, No. 05-51, together with Sanchez-Llamas
v. Oregon, No. 04-10566, presumably because both petitions raised issues under the VCCR.
The petition of Moises Sanchez-Llamas, a Mexican national convicted of attempted murder in
Oregon, raised the question whether exclusion of statements made prior to notification of the
foreign national’s right to contact his consulate is an appropriate remedy for a VCCR violation.
The Supreme Court held that it is not. See 126 S. Ct. at 2678-82. Because the ICJ has never
interpreted the VCCR to require exclusion of evidence, Mr. Sanchez-Llamas’s petition did not
raise the issue of deference to supranational rulings. The Court did look to foreign practice in
resolving the exclusionary rule question.
41. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2677. The Virginia state courts’ decisions in the case
are unreported. The doctrine of procedural default applied by the Virginia courts mirrors the
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rejecting Bustillo’s argument that the doctrine of procedural default
42
does not apply to VCCR claims.
Mr. Bustillo’s primary argument to the Court relied on the 2004
decision by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Avena case,
brought by Mexico against the United States to vindicate the VCCR
rights of fifty-one Mexican nationals on death row in various
43
American jurisdictions. Unlike most signatories to the VCCR, the
United States was—at the time of the Avena litigation—a signatory to
an “Optional Protocol” conferring jurisdiction on the ICJ to resolve
44
state-to-state disputes under the VCCR.
In Avena, the ICJ
considered and rejected the notion that VCCR claims could be barred
by the doctrine of procedural default; that doctrine, the ICJ
announced, impermissibly prevented the domestic courts from giving
“full effect” to rights conferred by the VCCR.45 Bustillo—along with
a number of amicus briefs representing international law scholars,
46
diplomats, and foreign sovereigns —thus asked the U.S. Supremes to
defer to the ICJ’s reading of the treaty and, effectively, hold
Virginia’s procedural default rule preempted by the treaty’s force as
supreme federal law.
The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision written by Chief Justice
47
Roberts, refused to do so. The Chief Justice allowed that “[t]he
doctrine applied in federal habeas corpus proceedings. See, e.g., Massaro v. United States, 538
U.S. 500, 504 (2003); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84-85 (1977).
42. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2687.
43. Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12
(Mar. 31).
44. Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963,
[1970] 21 U.S.T. 325, 326, T.I.A.S. No. 6820. Only 44 of the 170 parties to the VCCR are also
parties to the Optional Protocol. The U.S. exercised its right to withdraw from the Optional
Protocol following the Avena decision. Letter from Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec’y of State to
Kofi
Annan,
U.N.
Sec’y-Gen.
(Mar.
7,
2005),
available
at
http://untreaty.un.org/English/CNs/2005/101_200/186E.doc.
45. See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 72; see also LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 49798 (June 27) (reaching the same conclusion).
46. E.g., Brief of Former United States Diplomats as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners Mario A. Bustillo and Moises Sanchez-Llamas at 6, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548
U.S. 331 (2006) (No. 04-10566), 2005 WL 3543101, at *3-4; Brief of International Court of
Justice Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 9-10, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,
548 U.S. 331 (2006) (No. 04-10566), 2005 WL 3597807, at *20-24; Brief for Amici Curiae
Republic of Honduras and Other Foreign Sovereigns in Support of Petitioners at 9-10, SanchezLlamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) (No. 04-10566), 2005 WL 3597807, at *9-15.
47. Chief Justice Roberts wrote for himself and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito. Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment, but she agreed with the Chief in refusing to
defer to the ICJ’s reading of the treaty. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2689 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring). Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter.
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ICJ’s interpretation deserves ‘respectful consideration,’” but he
insisted that the Supreme Court’s power “‘to say what the law is’”
48
The majority’s analysis, moreover, made
extends to treaties.
relatively short work of the ICJ’s interpretation of the treaty, noting
that the VCCR itself mandates that the rights it conferred be
implemented according to the procedural rules of each domestic legal
system.49 Chief Justice Roberts also suggested that the judges of the
ICJ—most of whom were trained in civil law systems with
inquisitorial models of criminal prosecution—misunderstood the
critical role of procedural default rules in an adversary system of
50
justice.
By contrast, Justice Breyer’s dissent would have read the VCCR
51
in a manner “consistent with the ICJ’s reading of the Convention.”
Justice Breyer assumed—apparently without deciding—“that the
ICJ’s interpretation does not bind this Court,”52 and much of his
opinion was devoted to developing a strained reading of the ICJ’s
opinion that the Court would not have to reject as inconsistent with
domestic law.53 Nonetheless, the dissent’s view of “respectful
consideration” was plainly far more deferential to the ICJ than that of
54
the majority.
Sanchez-Llamas is unlikely to end debate on the Court on the
more general question of interpretive deference to supranational
rulings—a question I have canvassed in more depth in a companion

48. Id. at 2683-84 (quoting Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998), and Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
49. Id. at 2682-83.
50. Id. at 2685. Procedural default rules also play a crucial role in mediating potential
conflicts between parallel systems of courts. See Young, Institutional Settlement, supra note 1, at
1180-88. International lawyers have generally discounted such concerns, invoking the principle
that a party to a treaty “may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its
failure to perform a treaty.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331. However, this principle will have to be interpreted more narrowly if the
international and domestic legal systems are to be successfully integrated. Young, Institutional
Settlement, supra note 1, at 1180-82. The current international law approach—which insists on
ignoring how domestic legal systems actually operate—is hardly promising.
51. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2697 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 2700 (emphasis added).
53. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Federal Judicial Power and the International Legal Order,
2006 SUP. CT. REV. 59, 107.
54. See generally Mark L. Movsesian, Judging International Judgments, 48 VA. J. INT’L L.
65, 101-08 (2007) (reading the dissent as embracing a more deferential “comity model” of
interpretive authority).
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essay to this one.55 The important point for present purposes is that
its holding strongly encourages domestic courts to exercise
independent judgment in interpreting treaties, even when foreign or
supranational courts have already spoken.56 Neither the SanchezLlamas majority nor the dissent was prepared to give the ICJ’s
opinion in Avena the kind of deference that domestic courts accord to
arbitral awards under the New York Convention—that is, minimal
procedural scrutiny combined with an almost categorical refusal to
second-guess the foreign ruling on the merits.
The Court took a further, non-deferential step in its most recent
57
decision, Medellín v. Texas. José Ernesto Medellín confessed to
brutally raping and murdering two teen-age girls as part of a gang
initiation in Houston, Texas. The Texas state courts tried and
convicted him of capital murder and sentenced him to death.58 As a
Mexican national, however, Medellín was entitled to consular
notification under the VCCR, and the Mexican government has

55. See Ernest A. Young, Treaties as “Part of Our Law” (unpublished manuscript on file
with author) [hereinafter Young, Part of Our Law].
56. In her remarks at this Symposium, Melissa Waters suggested that the “respectful
consideration” stance adopted by the majority reflects a term of art, and that the standard
adopted in Sanchez-Llamas is actually more deferential than most commentators have
interpreted it to be. See Public and Private Law in the Global Adjudication System - part 3
(Feb. 15, 2008) (webcast, available at http://www.law.duke.edu/webcast/). Professor Waters
rightly notes that the “respectful consideration” language also appears in a line of cases
involving U.S. Supreme Court review of state court decisions on state law matters. See id. Such
review is ordinarily blocked by the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine, which
holds that “where the judgment of a state court rests upon two grounds, one of which is federal
and the other nonfederal in character, [the Supreme Court’s] jurisdiction fails if the nonfederal
ground is independent of the federal ground and adequate to support the judgment.” Fox Film
Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935). But sometimes the Court is willing to address the
state law ground in order to ensure that the state courts are not manipulating state law in order
to defeat the assertion of federal rights. See, e.g., Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95
(1938) (reviewing a state court’s determination that no contract existed because that
determination was antecedent to a federal claim of impairment under the Contract Clause).
When the Court engages in this sort of review—which is rare—it “accord[s] respectful
consideration and great weight to the views of the state’s highest court.” Id. at 100. As I explain
at greater length elsewhere, see Young, Part of Our Law, supra note 55, I doubt that “respectful
consideration”—even if that term is the same as “respectful consideration and great weight”—
has a settled meaning in this context, as the review-of-state-courts cases themselves are highly
sporadic and inconsistent. Normatively speaking, it would be inappropriate to accord the same
level of deference that the federal courts give to state judicial interpretations of the state’s own
law in a case like Sanchez-Llamas, in which a federal court interpreted a treaty of the United
States which is part of federal law under the Supremacy Clause. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at
2681-84.
57. 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
58. See Medellín v. State, Order, No. AP-71,997, slip op. (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 19, 1997).
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argued that, with its aid and advice, Medellín might have pled guilty
to a non-capital charge or at least achieved a more favorable result at
59
the sentencing phase of his trial. Texas conceded that it failed to
meet its VCCR obligations in this case, but it argued—and both the
60
state courts and the lower federal courts agreed —that Medellín’s
VCCR claim was barred by procedural default on account of his
failure to raise it in the state trial courts or on direct appeal.
Mr. Medellín thus found himself in a similar position to Mr.
Bustillo in Sanchez-Llamas. Unlike Bustillo, however, Medellín is
one of the fifty-one Mexican nationals covered by the ICJ’s judgment
in the Avena case. Whereas Bustillo had to ask the U.S. Supreme
Court to defer to the precedential force of the ICJ’s interpretation of
the VCCR to preempt domestic procedural default rules, Medellín
sought to invoke the force of the ICJ’s ruling as a binding judgment.
That effort was unavailing, however. The Supreme Court held, 6-3,61
that the Avena judgment was not “self-executing”—that is, that it did
not “create[] binding federal law in the absence of implementing
legislation” enacted by Congress.62 Chief Justice Roberts’ majority

59. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Government of the United Mexican States in Support
of Petitioner José Ernesto Medellín at 2-3, Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06984) (arguing that “Mexico has provided critical resources to aid in the defense of its nationals
facing the death penalty”). It is worth noting, however, that unlike many VCCR claimants,
Medellín was hardly a stranger in a strange land. He had lived in the United States since the age
of three, attended American schools, was fluent in English, and was no stranger to the
American criminal justice system. See Medellín v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 275-76 (5th Cir. 2004).
The Texas trial court, moreover, found—as an alternative holding to its procedural default
ruling—that Medellín had not been prejudiced by the State’s failure to observe his VCCR
rights. See Brief for Respondent at 49-50, Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984)
(noting that the trial court found that the failure to notify the Mexican consulate did not
prejudice the defendant and that “[t]he Texas Court of Criminal Appeals agreed”). On the
potentially critical importance of this holding, see infra notes 168-171 and accompanying text.
60. See Ex parte Medellin, No. WR-50,191-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 3, 2001) (not
designated for publication); Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 279-80 (5th Cir. 2004).
61. Chief Justice Roberts wrote for himself and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1352. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, agreeing that the
relevant treaties did not render the Avena judgment self-executing. See id. at 1372 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Justice Breyer dissented on behalf of himself and Justices Souter
and Ginsburg. Id. at 1375.
62. Id. at 1357. The Court also rejected an effort by President George W. Bush to
“execute” the Avena judgment by issuing an order to the state courts, holding that “the
Executive cannot unilaterally execute a non-self-executing treaty by giving it domestic effect.”
Id. at 1371; see also infra notes 155-159 and accompanying text.
In the interest of full disclosure, I note that I was a primary author of amicus briefs in
support of Texas in both the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court.
Those briefs, which addressed only the President’s memorandum, argued that the President’s
action was an unconstitutional intrusion not only on Congress’s authority but also on judicial
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opinion reached this conclusion based on the language of the
Optional Protocol and the U.N. Charter, which respectively confer
jurisdiction on the ICJ and impose on U.N. members states an
obligation to comply with the ICJ’s rulings.63 The Court relied as well
on the existence of an alternative enforcement mechanism for ICJ
rulings at the Security Council and the fact that “neither Medellín nor
his amici have identified a single nation that treats ICJ judgments as
64
binding in domestic courts.” In dissent, Justice Breyer complained
that “insofar as today’s holdings make it more difficult to enforce the
judgments of international tribunals . . . those holdings weaken that
65
rule of law for which our Constitution stands.”
Taken together, Sanchez-Llamas and Medellín seem to embody a
strong skepticism of supranational rulings as both precedents and
judgments. This skepticism is, as I have noted, a far cry from the
warm reception that foreign arbitral rulings receive in U.S. courts
under the New York Convention.
I explore some possible
explanations for this striking difference in treatment in the next Part.
II. EXPLAINING THE DISPARITY
One could be forgiven for finding the attitudes struck by
American courts toward foreign and international rulings somewhat
schizophrenic. Our courts warmly embrace foreign arbitral awards
under the New York Convention and narrowly construe the
Convention’s permissible grounds for challenging such awards. Yet
any effort by American jurists to cite foreign authority in
constitutional interpretation is contentious, and interpretations of
U.S. treaties by supranational courts in cases like Sanchez-Llamas
and Medellín are greeted with considerable skepticism. What is going
on?

independence and state autonomy.
See Amicus Curiae Brief of Constitutional and
International Law Scholars in Support of Respondent State of Texas, Medellín v. Texas, 128 S.
Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984), available at http://www.debev-oise.com/publications/pdf/TexasconstitutionalandintllawscholarsamicusMedellin2007.PDF [hereinafter Medellín Scholars’
Brief]; Brief of the States of Alabama, Montana, Nevada, and New Mexico as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent, Ex parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (No. AP-75207), available at http://www.debevoise.com/publications/pdf/CCA%20State%20Am-icus.PDF.
63. Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1357-59; see also infra notes 144-147 and accompanying text
(discussing the provisions of the Optional Protocol and the Charter).
64. See 128 S. Ct. at 1359-60 (discussing the Security Council procedure); id. at 1363-64
(discussing the practice of other nations).
65. Id. at 1391 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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One possibility is to think of this disparity as one between
“public law” and “private law” cases. That would not in itself be an
explanation, but it might suggest some plausible hypotheses regarding
the relative isolation of the two fields or the different functions that
courts perform in each area. I want to suggest, however, that greater
deference to arbitration decisions has less to do with the
public/private law dichotomy than it does with two other factors: the
difference between enforcing a judgment settling a particular dispute
and establishing a general rule of law to guide future disputes, and the
presence or absence of legislative action specifying the status of
supranational rulings. U.S. courts’ emphasis on these factors strikes
me as entirely correct. A dramatically lesser degree of deference for
foreign precedents than for foreign judgments is entirely appropriate
in both “public” and “private” law settings. And congressional
primacy concerning the status of foreign judgments is appropriate, in
most circumstances, even if one believes that the underlying treaties
should generally be considered self-executing. Before developing
these points, however, I want to start with some reasons to question
the comparison between arbitral awards under the New York
Convention and cases like Sanchez-Llamas and Medellín.
A. Apples or Oranges?
For the disparity in treatment between foreign arbitral awards
and foreign public law decisions to be meaningful, the two sets of
cases need to be at least somewhat analogous. In this section, I
suggest that the comparison is more tenuous than might appear at
first glance. The distance between arbitral enforcement cases and the
use of foreign decisions in cases like Roper v. Simmons, for instance,
should be obvious: Roper did not involve “enforcement” of any
foreign decisions, and the legal provisions interpreted in those
decisions—national constitutions and statutes, international custom
and treaties—were different from the provision at issue in the U.S.
case. And while Sanchez-Llamas did involve the force of a
supranational court decision interpreting the same treaty on the same
issue before the domestic court, it involved the precedential force of
the foreign opinion rather than the respect due to the foreign
judgment—a crucial distinction that I take up in the next section. In
this section, I want to focus on some additional distinctions between
foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention and the
judgments of supranational tribunals. While some of these
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distinctions may seem technical, I suggest that they stem from
important functional differences between the two situations.
Most of the cases enforcing arbitral awards involve foreign rather
than supranational arbitrators. As Roger Alford has demonstrated,
there are all sorts of difficulties bringing supranational tribunals
within the requirements of the New York Convention. “The text and
preparatory materials,” he notes, “suggest that international tribunals
established solely to resolve interstate disputes are not intended to be
subject to traditional enforcement mechanisms under the New York
66
Where the agreements establishing supranational
Convention.”
arbitral bodies are entered into by states, moreover, it is unclear
whether awards secured by or against private parties are covered by
“an agreement in writing” to arbitrate within the meaning of the
Convention; in such cases, the Convention will apply only if the
nation’s agreement is imputed to its private nationals.67 Moreover,
“[m]ost international tribunals render ‘anational’ awards governed by
the international legal system and not subject to the control of a
single national state. They therefore should not be viewed as arbitral
68
awards subject to New York Convention enforcement.”
These are not just technical impediments.
Consider, for
example, the potential extension of the Convention to cover
supranational decisions, where the arbitral award involves individuals
who were not themselves parties to the agreement creating the forum.
Where the private parties are plaintiffs, such extension of arbitration

66. See Alford, supra note 2, at 708.
67. See id. at 705-07. See New York Convention, supra note 9, art. II(1)-(2) (“Each
Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to
submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them
in respect to a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not . . . . The term ‘agreement
in writing’ shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by
the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.”). In Ministry of Defense of the
Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould, Inc., 887 F.2d 1357, 1363 (9th Cir. 1989), for example, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the New York Convention required
enforcement of an award by the Iran-U.S. claims tribunal against a private party, even though
that party was not a party to the agreement creating the tribunal. According to Judge
O’Scannlain, “the real question is not whether Gould entered into a written agreement to
submit its claims against Iran to arbitration, but whether the President—acting on behalf of
Gould—entered into such an agreement. The answer is clearly yes.” Id.
68. Alford, supra note 2, at 709 (citation omitted). See New York Convention, supra note
9, art. I(1)-(2) (“This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and
enforcement of such awards are sought . . . . The term ‘arbitral awards’ shall include not only
awards made by arbitrators appointed for each case but also those made by permanent arbitral
bodies to which the parties have submitted.”).
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agreements entered into by state parties to cover claims by one of the
states’ nationals would effectively create a private right of action for
individual plaintiffs. Such private rights of action are relatively rare
in international law, and they are controversial where they do exist.69
Where arbitral awards are enforced against private parties who did
70
not individually consent to the supranational forum, on the other
hand, a crucial line between arbitration and adjudication is crossed.
As the U.S. delegation that participated in drafting the Convention
reported,
[i]t is definitely understood . . . that the convention applies only
to awards resulting from arbitrations to which the parties have
submitted voluntarily. If the arbitration were conducted by a
permanent body to which the parties are obligated to refer their
disputes regardless of their will, the proceedings are judicial
rather than arbitral in character and the resulting award
consequently could not come within the purview of the
71
convention.
Further, there may well be significant functional differences
between arbitral awards rendered by panels under the auspices of a
particular state and those rendered by supranational bodies. On the
judicial side, after all, courts and commentators have frequently been
72
more willing to defer to foreign courts than to supranational ones.
The reason is that foreign tribunals are generally enmeshed in a
system of checks and balances created by domestic law, and the
foreign state’s political branches will have an interest in ensuring that
neither courts nor arbitral bodies treat foreign parties arbitrarily.73

69. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Review of U.S. Rulings by NAFTA Tribunals Stirs Worries,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2004, at A20; see also Ahdieh, supra note 1, at 2154 (“[I]ndividual access
can be expected to enhance international court influence, both by creating a domestic
constituency for the Court’s rulings and eliminating discretionary barriers to the review of
sensitive cases.”).
70. This was the case in Gould, as described by Professor Alford. See Alford, supra note 2,
at 705-07.
71. United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, May 20-June 10,
1958, Official Report of the United States Delegation 6 (Aug. 15, 1958) (quoted in Leonard V.
Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049, 1061 n.54 (1961).
72. See, e.g., Alford, supra note 2, at 716-21 (noting that federal courts afford comity to
judgments by foreign courts but observing that “there are no reported instances in the past
century in which decisions of an international tribunal have been subject to enforcement and
recognition” similar to judgments by foreign courts).
73. Cf. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box: Transnational Law
and the U.S. Constitution, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1989, 2012 (2004) (arguing that U.S. courts should
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The extent to which these checks actually operate will, of course, vary
significantly depending on the particular foreign state involved. But
tribunals existing wholly outside any such structure seem likely to be
less accountable still.
Where an award is subject to Convention enforcement because it
is controlled by a particular state’s domestic law, the analogy to cases
like Sanchez-Llamas fails on a different ground—that is, that the
domestic court enforcing the award is not deferring to the
supranational panel’s interpretation of international law. If, for
example, an American court were asked to defer to a NAFTA
arbitration panel’s interpretation of Canadian law, there is no a priori
reason to think that the supranational arbitrators have any
compelling advantage in expertise. And while a supranational body
might be better positioned to encourage uniform interpretations of
international law, that is hardly the case with respect to domestic law.
The only interpreters with a clear claim to deference concerning the
law of a foreign state are the courts of that state.74
These differences between enforcement and recognition in the
arbitration context and the question in cases like Sanchez-Llamas and
Medellín might be sufficient to explain the different results that occur
in each context. But I also think the organizers of this conference are
right to suspect that something more fundamental is going on. After
all, the presence of a statute mandating recognition of arbitration
awards simply begs the question: Why has Congress not mandated
similar deference to ICJ decisions? The reason, I think, has less to do
with the public/private distinction than with the different functions
that arbitral tribunals and courts perform in resolving disputes.
B. Public and Private Law
It is somewhat tempting to explain the disparity between
enforcement of arbitral awards and non-deference to courts like the
ICJ in terms of the longstanding distinction between “private” and
“public” law. Harold Maier has observed that, “[h]istorically, public
international law and private international law have been treated as

enforce the delegation doctrine more strictly “in the foreign context where political checks on
international agency action are weak”); Frank B. Cross, Thoughts on Goldilocks and Judicial
Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 195, 196 (“The [American] judiciary remains accountable to the
other branches of government and cannot stray too far from their preferences.”).
74. Cf. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225 (1991) (holding that federal circuit
courts should not defer to federal district courts construing the law of the state in which they
sit).
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two different legal systems that function more or less
75
The New York Convention itself furthers this
independently.”
temptation to ground the disparity in domestic treatment of foreign
rulings in the public/private dichotomy; after all, the Convention (as
adopted by the United States) restricts its coverage to disputes arising
out of “commercial” relationships. Hence, Roger Alford has
suggested that “[m]any international tribunals are engaged in
functions that intuitively one would exclude from the category of
arbitration. Among these include tribunals responsible for
prosecuting crimes, determining human rights violations, and
resolving personnel and administrative disputes.”76
I want to resist relying on any sort of “public/private” or
“commercial/noncommercial” distinction, however.
As John
Gotanda has noted, at least some sorts of international arbitrations
“may involve public and/or private international law. At times, the
77
divide is clear, but in many cases it is not.” For one thing, it is not
impossible to imagine extending arbitration to the areas Professor
Alford cites. “Personnel and administrative disputes,” for example,
are sometimes subject to arbitration in the domestic sphere,78 and
there is no reason in principle that an arbitrator could not decide a
human
rights
claim.
While
a
public/private
or
commercial/noncommercial distinction surely has intuitive appeal,
such distinctions are notoriously slippery in practice. The Legal
Realists have left American lawyers highly skeptical of public/private
dichotomies,79 and it is easy to see the public interest ramifications of

75. Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between
Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 280, 280 (1982).
76. Alford, supra note 2, at 707.
77. John Gotanda, Damages in Private International Law, 326 RECUEIL DES COURS 73, 91
(2007).
78. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28-29 (1991)
(permitting arbitration for an age discrimination claim regardless of the EEOC’s role in
regulating employment disputes); Olroyd v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 134 F.3d 72, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1998)
(concluding that an employee’s claim that he was unlawfully terminated as a whistleblower was
subject to an agreement to arbitrate employment disputes); Mgt. Recruiters Int’l, Inc. v. Nebel,
765 F. Supp. 419, 422 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (holding that “nonunion account executives[] do not fall
within the exception outlined in § 1 of the FAA” and enforcing and compelling arbitration
between the employees and their employer).
79. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485, 519 (2005) (“[T]he public/private distinction in international law
is difficult to maintain in light of the extensive critique of all public/private distinctions that has
been mounted by legal realists . . . .”); Ralf Michaels & Nils Jansen, Private Law Beyond the
State? Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 843, 856-57 (2006) (“In
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large-scale arbitrations that affect, say, the business prospects of key
domestic employers, the availability of insurance proceeds to clean up
80
81
toxic waste dumps, or rights to reproduce life-saving drugs.
Likewise, American courts have struggled for two centuries to
82
define the boundaries of “commercial” activity. Current law equates
83
“commercial” with “economic” activity —a broad category indeed—
and a vocal minority would extend the reach of Congress’s power
over “commerce” further still, including to human rights concerns
such as violence against women.84 At a minimum, any plausible
definition of “commercial” seems likely to include large swathes of
“public” law. What would one do with a case like Crosby v. National
Foreign Trade Council,85 for example, which involved trade sanctions
imposed by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on Burma?
Massachusetts disadvantaged companies bidding for state contracts if
the company in question also did business in Burma. The point of the
trade sanctions, of course, was to vindicate the strong view of the
People of Massachusetts that the military junta in Burma had a
deplorable human rights record. On the other hand, the case
involved the right to bid on contracts—frequently involving
multinational corporations—and in fact several foreign nations

the United States, few would still defend the autonomy of private law; it is commonplace that
the public/private distinction is an illusion.”).
80. See, e.g., Disston Co. v. Sandvik, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 745, 749 (W.D. Va. 1990) (granting
motion to compel arbitration of CERCLA claims concerning toxic waste disposal); Leksi, Inc. v.
Federal Ins. Co., 736 F. Supp. 1331, 1335 (D.N.J. 1990) (“[I]t is difficult to imagine any interest
that New Jersey could have that would be more compelling . . . than its interest in determining
the availability of funds for the cleanup of hazardous substances located within its
boundaries.”).
81. See, e.g., James Thuo Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and
Public Health Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 291,
305-08 (2002) (describing the tension between private patent rights and public health initiatives
in light of a patent arbitration decision ordering Canada to “repeal statutory provisions that
allowed generic drug manufacturers to stockpile patent products” and noting the acute
problems associated with the AIDS crisis in Africa).
82. Compare, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (defining “commerce” as
navigation or “intercourse”), and United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (defining
“commerce” narrowly to exclude manufacturing), with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937) (defining Congress’s power over “commerce” to include labor practices
concerning manufacturing employees), and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding
that possession of a firearm was not “commercial” activity).
83. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005) (holding that the regulation of the use
of homegrown marijuana for medicinal purposes falls exclusively under Congress’s Commerce
Power).
84. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 664 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
85. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
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sought to challenge Massachusetts’ policy through arbitration under
86
the WTO agreement. Such a case straddles virtually any conceivable
definition of public/private or commercial/noncommercial, and while
Crosby itself may be an unusually vivid illustration, the general
problem is likely to arise far more frequently.
This is not to say that the public/private distinction has no
relevance to the deference disparity in domestic courts’ treatment of
supranational decisions. The parties to certain kinds of disputes—
e.g., large contractual disputes between corporations—may well be
more willing than others to submit their claims to a forum that will
render a decision as to who gets what but not articulate a general
principle of law to bind future cases. If that is the case, it may be
because principles of private international law are more widely seen
to be settled than principles in the public sphere, which continues to
feature fundamental disagreements on the scope of human rights, the
importance of national sovereignty, and other foundational questions.
Under those circumstances, one would expect nations to be more
willing to cede to foreign and supranational actors the authority to
resolve disputes under the law as settled while reserving authority
over the declaration of public norms.
As I have already suggested, one hates to generalize about
categories as broad and ambiguously-defined as “public” and
“private” law. In any event, these last points suggest that correlations
between deference to foreign and supranational tribunals, on the one
hand, and the public or private nature of the dispute, on the other, are
driven by the relative importance in each circumstance of the dispute
settlement and law-declaring functions of courts. I consider those
functions in the next section.
C. The Dispute Settlement and Law-Declaring Functions of Courts
Most legal decisions perform a dual function: they settle the
dispute between the parties, and in so doing they declare the law
governing that dispute. As John Marshall so famously put it, “the
province and duty of the judicial department” is “to say what the law
is.”87 The two functions are, of course, closely connected. Chief

86. Id. at 383; see also Mitsuo Matsushita, Major WTO Dispute Cases Concerning
Government Procurement, 1 ASIAN J. OF WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 299, 310 (2006).
For a more extended discussion of Crosby, see Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent
Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139 (2001).
87. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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Justice Marshall explained that “[t]he province of the court is, solely,
to decide on the rights of individuals”—to resolve, in other words, the
dispute that the parties have brought before it—but “[t]hose who
apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and
88
Indeed, the most persuasive reading of
interpret that rule.”
Marbury grounds the power of judicial review—surely the most
dramatic instance of American courts’ law-declaring function—
squarely in the court’s obligation to decide all issues necessary to
resolve the particular dispute before it.89
Although the dispute settlement and law-declaring functions of
judicial decisions are generally connected, it is possible—at least
formally—to disaggregate them. Some judicial systems, both abroad
and in the American states, permit courts to issue advisory opinions,
which may declare the law on a particular issue without the close
connection to a litigated dispute between particular parties that is
90
required in the U.S. federal courts by Article III of the Constitution.
Arbitration, on the other hand, typically aims to settle the dispute
between the parties without necessarily stating a rule for future cases;
in many circumstances, the arbitrator need not even articulate the
grounds of his decision. To be sure, an advisory opinion may well
effectively settle a legal dispute that has not yet been brought to

88. Id. at 170, 177.
89. See, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911) (“The right to declare a law
unconstitutional arises because an act of Congress relied upon by one or the other of such
parties in determining their rights is in conflict with the fundamental law. The exercise of this,
the most important and delicate duty of this court, is not given to it as a body with revisory
power over the action of Congress, but because the rights of the litigants in justiciable
controversies require the court to choose between the fundamental law and a law purporting to
be enacted within constitutional authority, but in fact beyond the power delegated to legislative
branch of the Government.”); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 67 (5th
ed. 2003) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER].
90. Compare, e.g., MA. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 3, art. 2, amended by MA. CONST. amend. LXXXV
(permitting the governor or the legislature “to require the opinions of the justices of the
supreme judicial court, upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions”); and
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 89, at 85 (“Like the constitutional courts of many European
nations, the European Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, and the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights all enjoy explicit grants of jurisdiction to decide properly
presented abstract questions.”), with Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 598 n.4
(1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The purpose of the standing doctrine is to ensure that
courts do not render advisory opinions rather than resolve genuine controversies between
adverse parties.”). See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 89, at 78-85 (discussing the
general prohibition on advisory opinions in the federal courts and comparing state and foreign
examples).
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court, and a string of consistent arbitral awards may effectively
establish a norm that other parties can follow.
Such disaggregation has costs. Requiring a litigated dispute
constrains the power of courts by reducing the courts’ opportunities
to exercise power and narrowing their ability to control their own
91
agendas. Tying law-declaration to settlement of particular disputes
also aims at assuring “the functional requisites of effective
adjudication”—that is, the adversary presentation and concrete
factual backdrop that will generally assist the court in framing and
92
Advisory opinions expand the
deciding the issues before it.
circumstances in which courts may act and, at the same time, deprive
them of some of the inputs necessary for an effective decision.
Dispute settlement without law-declaration, on the other hand,
removes important elements of judicial discipline, such as the need to
articulate a principled ground of decision and to consider the
potential impact of that principle on the decision of future cases.93
One of the principal criticisms of the Supreme Court’s intervention in
Bush v. Gore,94 after all, was that the Court insufficiently explained
the basis of its reasoning, combined with the fear that the Court’s
rationale was “a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train
only.”95
Just as courts exercise both dispute settlement and law-declaring
functions, their decisions can be authoritative in two corresponding
ways: as judgments and as precedents. Within the domestic legal
system, the judgment force of a court’s prior decision is expressed
91. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 89, at 67-68; Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional
Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1365-68 (1973); Jonathan R. Siegel, A
Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 77-78 (2007).
92. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on
the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 51 (1984).
93. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1374-75 (1995) (“[T]he true test [of a decision] comes when
the writing judge reasons it out on paper,” and that “[i]t is not so unusual to modulate, transfer,
or even switch an originally intended rationale or result in midstream because ‘it just won’t
write.’”); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1959).
94. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
95. Pamela S. Karlan, Exit Strategies in Constitutional Law: Lessons for Getting the Least
Dangerous Branch Out of the Political Thicket, 82 B.U. L. REV. 667, 695 (2002) (quoting Smith
v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting)); see also David A. Strauss, Bush
v. Gore, What Were They Thinking?, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE AND THE SUPREME COURT
184, 185 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001) (“[T]he majority opinion insisted
that its rationale was to be applied, essentially, only in this case - basically conceding that the
result, not the legal principle, dictated the outcome.”).
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through the rules of full faith and credit and res judicata.96 Ordinarily,
the judgment will fix the rights and obligations of the parties, subject
to quite narrow grounds for challenging the original court’s
jurisdiction and/or procedures.97 When the original judgment has
been rendered by a foreign court, strong norms of international
98
comity likewise prescribe enforcement with minimal secondguessing by the domestic court.99 The New York Convention, of
course, codifies an even stronger version of the comity principle for
100
foreign arbitral awards.
The precedential force of a ruling, on the other hand, refers to
the ruling’s authoritative force in a new proceeding not encompassed
96. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the . . .
judicial Proceedings of every other State.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006) (requiring federal courts to
give full faith and credit to state judgments); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§§ 13-15 (1982) (detailing the rules of res judicata).
97. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (“A fundamental precept
of common-law adjudication, embodied in the related doctrines of collateral estoppel and res
judicata, is that a ‘right, question, or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction . . . cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same
parties or their privies . . . .’” (quoting Southern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49
(1897))).
98. International “comity” is often used to connote an amorphous set of norms requiring
deference to foreign law or tribunals. See generally Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping “International
Comity,” 83 IOWA L. REV. 893 (1998) (surveying and criticizing the various uses of “comity”).
Respect for foreign judgments is the most precise and well-settled form of “international
comity” and, as such, is relatively uncontroversial. See id. at 897.
99. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 205-06 (1895):
When an action is brought in a court of this country, by a citizen of a foreign
country against one of our own citizens, to recover a sum of money adjudged by
a court of that country to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff, and the
foreign judgment appears to have been rendered by a competent court, having
jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties, and upon due allegations and
proofs, and opportunity to defend against them, and its proceedings are
according to the course of a civilized jurisprudence, and are stated in a clear
and formal record, the judgment is prima facie evidence, at least, of the truth of
the matter adjudged; and it should be held conclusive upon the merits tried in
the foreign court unless some special ground is shown for impeaching the
judgment, as by showing that it was affected by fraud or prejudice, or that by
the principles of international law, and by the comity of our own country, it
should not be given full credit and effect.
Although Hilton was decided over a century ago, its approach has largely been codified in
present law. See UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4, 13 (pt. 2) U.L.A.
58-59 (2002); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 481, 482 (1987).
100. Despite efforts to conclude an enforcement treaty on the New York Convention model
for foreign judicial judgments, such efforts have thus far been unsuccessful. Hence, it would go
too far to equate the judgment force of foreign court decisions with that accorded to foreign
arbitral awards.
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by the prior judgment. I want to use both “precedent” and
“authority” broadly for purposes of the present discussion. As used
here, precedent includes both the “vertical” force of decisions issued
by a court with power of appellate review over a second court, and
the “horizontal” force of decisions issued by the same court (which
that court can overrule) or by courts outside the line of appellate
hierarchy. As my inclusion of the latter kind of precedent will
suggest, I take “authority” to include not only the power to bind
another court but also any situation in which the prior decision carries
some degree of weight beyond the purely persuasive force of its
101
reasoning.
In Sanchez-Llamas, for example, the question was
whether—apart from whatever reasons could be mustered in support
of the ICJ’s interpretation of the VCCR on the merits—it should
count for anything that that interpretation had been issued by the ICJ
as opposed to a brief or a law review article.102 This additional weight
might derive from the perceived expertise of the other tribunal, the
need to respect an international tribunal as a matter of foreign
relations, the need for all courts to coalesce around a uniform and
settled interpretation, or similar reasons.
Within the domestic legal system, we generally draw a radical
distinction between the judgment and precedential force of a court’s
decision in a prior case. Consider, for example, a state court lawsuit
involving a question of federal law, in which the losing party does not
appeal and the trial court’s ruling thus stands undisturbed as a final
judgment.
As a judgment, the state trial court’s resolution
definitively binds the parties, and as a matter of res judicata it will
bind any court in the land in which enforcement might be
challenged—up to and including the U.S. Supreme Court. Equally
obviously, however, the precedential force of the state court’s ruling
on the federal question before it is extremely limited. It will have no
force at all—beyond the persuasive force of the judge’s reasoning—
on any other state’s courts, much less a lower federal court or the U.S.
Supreme Court.
101. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 3-27 (1979) (defining legal authority
as existing any time the existence of a legal rule counts as a reason for doing or not doing
something, independent of the underlying reasons for the rule); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY
OF FREEDOM 35 (1986); see also Young, Foreign Law, supra note 34, at 151-56 (applying this
definition to the Supreme Court’s citation of foreign decisions and practices).
102. I suppose that there are circumstances when a law review article or a brief might carry
authoritative weight apart from the persuasiveness of its reasoning—the views on procedure of
the late Charles Alan Wright come to mind. But that’s not how the courts treat my articles or
briefs.
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As I have already suggested, deference to foreign arbitral awards
stems from their treatment as judgments that definitively settle the
dispute between the parties. When an ordinary court settles such a
dispute, the force of the judgment stems from the legitimacy of the
judicial system as a whole, which in turn derives from factors such as
the courts’ constitutional mandate and the perceived quality of their
deliberations and procedures. The force of arbitral judgments, on the
103
other hand, derives from the consent of the parties.
Hence, the
Supreme Court has made clear that strong judicial deference to
arbitral awards is tied directly to the fact that the parties have agreed
to have their dispute settled in such fashion:
Because the parties have contracted to have disputes settled by
an arbitrator chosen by them rather than by a judge, it is the
arbitrator’s view of the facts and of the meaning of the contract
that they have agreed to accept. Courts thus do not sit to hear
claims of factual or legal error by an arbitrator as an appellate
court does in reviewing decisions of lower courts. . . . [A]s long
as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the
contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a
court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice
to overturn his decision.104
Arbitration is thus, in many respects, equivalent to any other outof-court settlement by the parties to a dispute. Such settlements are
enforceable in court as a matter of contract,105 generally without any
inquiry into whether the settlement agreement “correctly” resolved
the dispute as a matter of law.
While we may be content to let parties settle their disputes any
way they like, ceding the law-declaring function of a court to some
other body is considerably more problematic. Law declaring is a

103. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 8, at 51 (“The central element of arbitration is the intention
of the parties as expressed in the arbitration agreement.”); Astoria Med. Group v. Health Ins.
Plan, 182 N.E.2d 85, 87 (N.Y. 1962) (stating that arbitration is “essentially a creature of contract,
a contract in which the parties themselves charter a private tribunal for the resolution of their
disputes”). The Court’s decisions suggest that their solicitude for arbitration stems from the
parties’ consent, not the enhanced efficiency of arbitration. In Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v.
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985), for example, the Court upheld the parties’ agreement to arbitrate
certain state law claims, even though it would have been more efficient to stay arbitration
pending resolution of parallel federal claims being litigated in federal court.
104. United Paperworkers Int’l, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37-38 (1987).
105. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994) (holding that
a breach of a settlement agreement is “a claim for breach of a contract, part of the consideration
for which was dismissal of an earlier federal suit”).
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public, sovereign function; it affects not only the parties to the dispute
before the court, but also all other parties that might be affected by
the legal rule that the court declares. In those circumstances, the
consent of the parties cannot compensate for the lack of a
decisionmaker constituted by and proceeding according to the
ordinary constitutional and statutory rules governing judicial
institutions. No one thinks, for instance, that the reasons articulated
in an ordinary domestic arbitration award should have precedential
authority in subsequent litigation in the courts involving different
parties, other than the persuasive force of the arbitrator’s reasoning.
Party consent can confer authority on a non-judicial decisionmaker to
settle the dispute between them, but they cannot empower that
decisionmaker to declare law that will be authoritative in other
proceedings.
This intuition is confirmed by a number of doctrines that protect
the law-declaring function of the government from being undermined
through various forms of contractual agreements. For example, the
ordinary rule in the federal courts is that, when a dispute becomes
moot on appeal to a higher court, the opinion of the court below must
106
be vacated and the case dismissed. When such a case becomes moot
by reason of settlement of the parties, however, the opinion below is
presumptively not subject to vacatur, the reason being that “[j]udicial
precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the legal
community as a whole. They are not merely the property of private
litigants and should stand unless a court concludes that the public
interest would be served by vacatur.”107 When the government itself
enters into contracts, established doctrine holds that agreements to
surrender sovereign powers must be stated with unmistakable
clarity,108 and that in any event, certain sovereign powers simply
cannot be contracted away.109 These latter cases, while not involving

106. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950).
107. United States Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26 (1994)
(quoting Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 40 (1993)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
108. See, e.g., Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41,
52 (1986); Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) 420, 421 (1837); Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 536-38 (1830).
109. See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23 (1977); Stone v. Mississippi, 101
U.S. 814, 817-18 (1880); W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 519-20 (1848)
(holding that a State’s contracts do not surrender its eminent domain power). Both the
unmistakability and reserved powers or sovereign acts doctrines are construed in great detail in
United States v. Winstar, 518 U.S. 839 (1996) (plurality opinion).
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the law-declaring power of courts, do confirm that lawmaking is a
public function that generally cannot be compromised by private
agreement.
Another set of doctrines protect the law-declaring function of the
U.S. Supreme Court with respect to questions of federal law. (And
remember, the meaning of the VCCR in Sanchez-Llamas was, under
110
the Supremacy Clause, a federal question. ) The Supreme Court has
the last word on the meaning of federal law, overriding conflicting
interpretations of that law by the state supreme courts,111 state
112
113
the President,
and—in the case of
executive officials,
constitutional law not subject to change through ordinary
legislation—Congress itself.114 When Congress shifts federal judicial
business to non-Article III fora, such as adjudication before a federal
administrative agency, it ordinarily must allow for some degree of
Article III judicial review, particularly of questions of law.115 And
while Congress plainly has some power to restrict the jurisdiction of
116
the Supreme Court under Article III’s “Exceptions Clause,”
prominent scholars have argued that that power does not include the
authority to eliminate the Court’s “essential functions,” defined as
“maintaining the uniformity and supremacy of federal law.”117

110. See generally Young, Part of Our Law, supra note 55 (emphasizing that U.S. treaties
are part of federal law).
111. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
112. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
113. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
114. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
115. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
116. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that “the supreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction . . . with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make”).
See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 89, at 337-42 (discussing Congress’s power to
restrict the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court).
117. Leonard Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 201-02 (1960). The original version of the “essential functions”
argument appeared in Henry Hart’s seminal dialogue on jurisdiction-stripping. Henry Hart,
The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66
HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1364-65 (1953). Other scholars have argued that the Court’s law-declaring
authority over federal law is central to the Supreme Court’s textually mandated position of
supremacy over the “inferior” federal courts. See generally James Pfander, JurisdictionStripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEXAS L. REV.
1433 (2000); Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46
STAN. L. REV. 817 (1994). My own view is that the “essential functions” of the Court may not
be susceptible of a sufficiently precise definition to make them the crux of doctrine limiting
jurisdiction-stripping, see Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the
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Law-declaring is, then, very different from dispute settlement.
The difference is, in fact, grounded in a dichotomy of public and
private after all—not public and private law, but rather the public and
private function of courts.118 That dichotomy is, in turn, reflected in
the distinction between the precedential and judgment effects of
judicial rulings. In my view, this is an entirely sufficient justification
for the disparity between deference to foreign arbitral awards and
non-deference to the decisional rationales of foreign and
supranational courts. When a foreign decision has only judgmental
force, we are generally content to defer to the parties’ decision to
resolve their dispute through foreign arbitration. But domestic courts
are considerably more leery of ceding their law-declaring function to
foreign and supranational courts by deferring to the precedential
force of foreign decisions.
One potential objection to this view is grounded in the finer
points of res judicata law, which in some circumstances extends the
judgment force of a prior ruling to parties not involved in the original
litigation. Under the doctrine of non-mutual collateral estoppel, a
party to the original decision may sometimes be bound by factual or
legal determinations in that decision, even when the original
119
judgment is invoked by a non-party to the original litigation. This
doctrine blurs, if only to a minor extent, the distinction between the
dispute settlement and law-declaring functions of judicial decisions,
because it turns the judgment force of the prior court’s resolution of
the dispute between the initial parties into a rule binding at least some
subsequent cases involving other persons.120 Nonmutual collateral
estoppel suggests, in other words, that even the judgment force of a
prior decision may have an impact on future cases.
This objection has two answers within the law of judgments,
Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEXAS L. REV. 1549 (2000), but there is no doubt that lawdeclaring is central to our conception of the Court’s constitutional role.
118. It is worth noting that, to some extent, arbitration may protect the courts’ law-declaring
function by taking cases in which dispute settlement is the preeminent interest at stake out of
the system, leaving more resources to concentrate on declaring the law in the cases that remain.
See Warren E. Burger, Isn’t There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982).
119. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971)
(abandoning the requirement of mutuality of parties for assertion of collateral estoppels);
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331-33 (1979) (permitting, in some circumstances,
the “offensive” use of collateral estoppels by a nonparty to a prior lawsuit).
120. It is worth noting, however, that this blurring occurs only in a very narrow category of
cases. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 358 F.3d 31, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(noting that although the Supreme Court has permitted using nonmutual collateral estoppel, it
has “disallow[ed] preclusion where it would create perverse incentives or unfairness”).
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however, and although both are somewhat technical, each points to a
broader structural principle that reinforces my claim here. First,
established doctrine prohibits the use of nonmutual collateral
estoppel against the Government.121 This is significant because the
core of the “public international law” category—e.g., human rights
claims, international law-based challenges to domestic legislation—
will tend to involve the Government as a litigant, so that limiting the
judgment force of decisions in these areas protects the political
branches’ authority to participate in the ongoing process of
interpreting international law and determining the extent to which it
should be integrated into the domestic legal system. Moreover, the
rationale for the exception has been grounded explicitly in the need
to protect the courts’ law-declaring function. The Supreme Court has
thus observed that, because “the Government is more likely than any
private party to be involved in lawsuits against different parties which
nonetheless involve the same legal issues,” “[a] rule allowing
nonmutual collateral estoppel against the Government in such cases
would substantially thwart the development of important questions of
law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular legal
issue.”122
A second answer stems from the rule limiting the res judicata
effect of a ruling on a question of federal law when a court’s
resolution of that question cannot be appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court. This unusual situation may arise when a state court decides a
question of federal law, but because the strict rules of justiciability
under Article III do not apply to state courts, the issue is decided in a
123
case that the U.S. Supreme Court cannot hear on appeal. In such
cases, the Court has said that the state court’s decision of the federal
issue would not be res judicata for purposes of later proceedings in
federal court.124 This rule suggests, for example, that a foreign or
supranational tribunal’s interpretation of a U.S. treaty—a question, as
the Sanchez-Llamas Court pointed out, not only of international but

121. See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 162 (1984).
122. Id. at 160.
123. See, e.g., Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943) (per curiam) (finding that though the
state court decided the federal constitutional issue because the plaintiffs were allowed, under
state justiciability rules, to assert the rights of third parties, the U.S. Supreme Court lacked
jurisdiction over the appeal because the plaintiffs lacked standing under federal law); Doremus
v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952) (similar).
124. See Fidelity Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, 274 U.S. 123, 130 (1927); see also HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 89, at 138-40 (discussing this rule).
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also of federal law125—would not bind the federal courts whether or
not there was mutuality of parties. After all, the foreign decision
would not have been within the U.S. Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction. In any event, the broader point of the rule is that the
rules of res judicata must give way where necessary to preserve the
Supreme Court’s power “to say what the law is.” The law-declaring
authority of the domestic courts over domestic law thus trumps any
deference ordinarily owed to a prior judgment.
Finally, it is worth noting that the structure of many—if not
most—supranational tribunals emphasize the dispute settlement
function over the law-declaring function. The Statute of the
International Court of Justice, for example, declares that the ICJ’s
decisions have “no binding force except between the parties and in
126
Likewise, supranational litigation
respect of that particular case.”
under the NAFTA and the WTO agreement is conducted on an
127
explicitly arbitral model, with no formal doctrine of precedent.
These arrangements at the international level reflect the civil law
tradition that “judicial decisions are not a source of law. It would
violate the rules against judicial lawmaking if decisions of courts were
to be binding on subsequent courts.”128 The relevant agreements thus
seem to contemplate that supranational decisions will have force as
judgments, not as precedents.
To be sure, it is always hard to know quite what to make of a
judicial body’s profession to be not bound by precedent. After all, as
Evan Caminker has noted, “frequent adherence to precedent is a
prerequisite to effective adjudication: Courts simply do not have the
129
time to fully address each legal issue raised by every case.” And in
fact, many have noted that the formal rejection of precedent in the
125. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2684 (2006).
126. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 59, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1062.
The Sanchez-Llamas majority emphasized this language in refusing to defer to the ICJ’s
interpretation of the VCCR in Avena. See 126 S. Ct. at 2684.
127. See, e.g., Allan Z. Hertz, Shaping the Trident: Intellectual Property Under NAFTA,
Investment Protection Agreements and at the World Trade Organization, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 261,
280 (1997) (“As part of public international law, GATT/WTO law does not incorporate the
formal common law doctrine of stare decisis which makes judicial precedents binding.”).
128. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN
AMERICA 46 (3d ed. 2007).
129. Caminker, supra note 117, at 827; see also Charles Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1140, 1144 (1994) (“We want to avoid being like the man who cannot get to
work in the morning because he must keep returning home to make quite sure he has turned off
the gas.”).
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civil law tradition masks a considerably more complicated reality.130
The same is true of the ICJ and of arbitrations under the NAFTA and
WTO agreements, as well as international arbitration more
generally.131
Still, it surely counts for something that these
supranational bodies exercise a law-declaring function only in the
teeth of their enabling agreements, and often without the discursive
traditions or institutional continuity that are important to maintaining
132
a coherent doctrine of stare decisis.
D. The Primacy of Congressional Choice
If I am right that the difference between judgments and
precedents is critical in determining how domestic courts treat foreign
and supranational rulings, that suggests that the Medellín case,
decided this past Term, is a very different case from Sanchez-Llamas.
Sanchez-Llamas, after all, involved the precedential force of the ICJ’s
Avena decision; Mr. Medellín, on the other hand, is one of the 51
Mexican nationals explicitly covered by the Avena judgment. Does
that mean Medellín should have been entitled to the relief on his
VCCR claim that was denied to Mr. Bustillo in Sanchez-Llamas?
130. See MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 128, at 47 (“[A]lthough there is no
formal rule of stare decisis, the practice is for judges to be influenced by prior decisions. . . .
[T]he fact is that courts do not act very differently toward reported decisions in civil law
jurisdictions than do courts in the United States.”).
131. A prominent ICJ judge has emphasized, for example, that “a court cannot only resolve
a particular case but can contribute to the growth of the legal system which resolves future
cases. That has preeminently been the case in the common law. It is true in the international
legal system as well.” Stephen M. Schwebel, The Docket and Decisionmaking Process of the
International Court of Justice, 13 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. 543, 546-47 (1990). Similarly,
NAFTA and WTO awards frequently parse prior case law. See also, e.g., Susan D. Franck, The
Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law
Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1611-12 (2005) (observing that
although “[t]he ICJ Statute suggests that tribunals should not rely on private arbitral decisions
as binding authority . . . . [a]s a practical matter . . . private investors, governments, and arbitral
tribunals rely on previous awards to interpret similar provisions in investment treaties”); Alex
M. Niebruegge, Provisional Application of the Energy Charter Treaty: The Yukos Arbitration
and the Future Place of Provisional Application in International Law, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 355, 372
(2007) (“[I]n practice, arbitral awards tend to be regarded as a form of soft precedent.”);
Catherine A. Rogers, The Arrival of the “Have-Nots” in International Arbitration, 8 NEV. L.J.
341, 370 (2007) (arguing that, “[u]nlike domestic arbitration, the international arbitration system
has also created public goods through an informal system of precedent”); Michael Waibel,
Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign Bonds in International Arbitration, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 711,
716 (2007) (observing that “[a]lthough ICSID awards do not possess the force of precedent,
ICSID arbitral tribunals frequently rely on past awards”).
132. ICJ judgments are often quite conclusory in exposition, which can make it quite
difficult to determine the meaning of a judgment as precedent. WTO and NAFTA panels, on
the other hand, sit for a single case only.
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Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion for the Medellín majority said
133
and I want to defend that answer as correct here,
“no,”
notwithstanding the weight that I have just put on the distinction
between precedents and judgments.134 The reason derives from the
distinction between the force of a treaty on the international plane
and its implementation within the domestic legal system. There is no
question that the ICJ’s judgment in Avena binds the U.S. as a matter
135
of international law, and Texas’s subsequent execution of Mr.
Medellín—if and to the extent that it was carried out without
providing the “review and reconsideration” mandated by the ICJ’s
136
order —placed the U.S. in violation of the judgment. The question,
however, is how the binding force of that judgment is to be
implemented within the domestic legal system. On that question,
Medellín confirmed the primary role of Congress in specifying,
through legislation, how foreign and supranational judgments are to
be enforced in domestic courts.137
Much of the discussion in (and about) Medellín concerns the
general question when treaty-obligations are “self-executing”—that
is, when they may be given effect by domestic courts without further
action by the political branches. That is an interesting question,138 but
the actual issue in Medellín was narrower. As the Court recognized,
the “self-execution” question breaks down into a number of quite
distinct issues.139 While the VCCR is plainly “self-executing” in the
sense that federal, state, and local law enforcement officers are

133. Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1353 (2008).
134. I put to one side the possibility, noted by the Court but not apparently relied upon as
the basis for the Court’s ruling, that Medellín cannot be considered a “party” to the Avena
judgment in the relevant sense. Compare Id. at 1360 (“[T]he ICJ can hear disputes only
between nations, not individuals. . . . The dissent does not explain how Medellín, an individual,
can be a party to the ICJ proceeding.”), with id. at 1387 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Mexico
brought the Avena case in part in the exercise of its right of diplomatic protection of its
nationals . . . including Medellín . . . . Such derivative claims are a well-established feature of
international law . . . .” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
135. See id. at 1365.
136. See infra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
137. See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1365-66.
138. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution,
and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999); Martin S. Flaherty, History
Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the
Land,” 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (1999); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1999) [hereinafter Vazquez, Laughing].
139. See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1356-57 & nn. 2-3. See generally Carlos Manuel Vazquez,
The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695 (1995) (highlighting several
distinct issues often lumped together under the notion of “self-executing” treaties).
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obliged to provide consular notification even in the absence of federal
140
implementing legislation, that conclusion does not speak to the
distinct issues of individual rights to assert VCCR violations in
domestic courts,141 the remedies to be provided for such violations,142
or the implementation of ICJ judgments. Indeed, even if the
Supremacy Clause’s inclusion of treaties as the “law of the land”
created a general presumption in favor of self-execution,143 there is no
obvious reason to treat judgments—which the Clause does not
mention—in the same fashion.
The Medellín Court treated the self-execution question as a
particularistic one, eschewing broad default rules in favor of close
analysis of the relevant treaty provisions. Its holding thus rested on
an interpretation of the VCCR’s Optional Protocol and the United
Nations Charter, under which “[e]ach Member of the United Nations
undertakes to comply with the decision of the [ICJ] in any case to
144
The Court accepted the Executive Branch’s
which it is a party.”
construction of the Charter’s language as “a commitment on the part
of U.N. Members to take future action through their political
branches to comply with an ICJ decision.”145 Alongside the text, the
Court also pointed to the Charter’s structure. In particular, Chief
Justice Roberts emphasized the Charter’s “sole remedy for
noncompliance” with an ICJ ruling: “referral to the United Nations
Security Council by an aggrieved state.”146 The presence of this
“nonjudicial” remedy, the Court reasoned, was “itself evidence that
ICJ judgments were not meant to be enforceable in domestic

140. See Cornejo v. County of San Diego, 504 F.3d 853, 856-57 (9th Cir. 2007) (“There is no
question that the Vienna Convention is self-executing.”).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 67-68 (1st Cir. 2000) (Selya & Boudin, JJ.,
concurring) (concluding that the VCCR does not create rights enforceable by individuals).
142. See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2682 (2006) (rejecting exclusion of
evidence as a remedy for a VCCR violation); De Los Santos Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183
(2d Cir. 2008) (rejecting a foreign national’s claim for damages for a VCCR violation under 42
U.S.C. § 1983); Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822 (7th Cir. 2007) (permitting a § 1983 claim); United
States v. Bustos de la Pava, 268 F.3d 157, 163-66 (2d Cir. 2001) (considering counsel’s failure to
raise a VCCR argument as the predicate for a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of
counsel claim).
143. See, e.g., Vazquez, Laughing, supra note 138, at 2172 (so arguing).
144. U.N. Charter art. 94(1).
145. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 34, Medellín v.
Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04-5928) (emphasis in original), quoted at 128 S. Ct. at 1358
(“We agree with this construction of Article 94.”).
146. 128 S. Ct. at 1359 (citing the U.N. Charter).
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courts.”147 This reasoning resonates with a line of decisions in
domestic civil rights cases holding that remedies against state and
148
federal officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Bivens decision,
respectively, are unavailable if Congress has provided an adequate
149
alternative remedy.
In the case of arbitral awards under the New York Convention,
Congress has enacted a statute that expressly obligates and empowers
150
Express statutes
the domestic courts to enforce such awards.
likewise govern the enforcement of awards under the investor-state
arbitration provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement,
although the statutory rules are more nuanced. Such awards are
generally enforceable in domestic courts pursuant to the New York
151
and ICSID Conventions, which are in turn implemented by specific
152
domestic legislation.
But the NAFTA implementing legislation

147. Id. The Court also emphasized that “[t]he Executive Branch has unfailingly adhered to
its view that the relevant treaties do not create domestically enforceable federal law.” Id. at
1361 (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 145 at
27-29). The Court did not accord interpretive deference to the ICJ’s own views about the
binding force of that court’s judgments, noting that courts generally do not have authority to
determine the res judicata effects of their own judgments. See id. at 1361 n.9.
148. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971) (recognizing a federal common law right of action, implied under the Constitution itself,
for violations of constitutional rights by federal officers).
149. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1
(1981) (holding that fisherman could not use § 1983 as a vehicle for asserting claims under
federal environmental statutes, because those statutes had their own “elaborate enforcement
provisions”); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (denying Bivens relief for a federal employee
alleging retaliatory discharge in denial of his First Amendment rights, on the ground that
Congress had provided for a statutory remedy before the Civil Service Commission); Schweiker
v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (rejecting plaintiffs’ Due Process challenge, under Bivens, to
denial of Social Security benefits on the ground that the Social Security Act provided its own
administrative and judicial remedies).
150. See 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2006) (“Within three years after an arbitral award falling under the
Convention is made, any party to the arbitration may apply to any court having jurisdiction
under this chapter for an order confirming the award as against any other party to the
arbitration. The court shall confirm the award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or
deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the said Convention.”).
151. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1136(6), Dec. 8,
1993, 32 I.L.M. 605, 643; Renee Lettow Lerner, International Pressure to Harmonize: The U.S.
Civil Justice System in an Era of Global Trade, 2001 BYU L. REV. 229, 287 (“An investor can
seek enforcement of an award under the ICSID Convention, the New York Convention, or the
Inter-American Convention.”).
152. The statute implementing the ICSID convention provides that “[a]n award of an
arbitral tribunal rendered pursuant to chapter IV of the [ICSID Convention] shall create a right
arising under a treaty of the United States. The pecuniary obligations imposed by such an award
shall be enforced and shall be given the same full faith and credit as if the award were a final
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strictly limits the ability of parties other than the U.S. to invoke
NAFTA in domestic litigation, and these limitations presumably limit
153
The
the invocation of supranational NAFTA judgments as well.
important point, of course, is that for all these arbitration awards, the
effect of foreign and supranational judgments is defined and limited
by congressional act.
There is no such statute for ICJ judgments rendered under the
VCCR and its Optional Protocol. I have little doubt that Congress
could have enacted a statute specifying how ICJ judgments should be
enforced, or that such a statute could, if Congress so chose, preempt
154
Congress has not done so,
state rules of procedural default.
however, and the critical importance of that omission was
underscored by the Medellín Court’s rejection of President George
W. Bush’s effort to fill the gap by executive fiat. The President had

judgment of a court of general jurisdiction of one of the several States.” 22 U.S.C. § 1650a
(2006).
153. See 19 U.S.C. § 3312(b)(2) (2006) (“No State law, or the application thereof, may be
declared invalid as to any person or circumstance on the ground that the provision or
application is inconsistent with the Agreement, except in an action brought by the United States
for the purpose of declaring such law or application invalid.”); id. § 3312(c) (“No person other
than the United States . . . shall have any cause of action or defense under . . . the Agreement or
by virtue of Congressional approval thereof . . . .”).
The WTO agreement has been
implemented similarly. See id. § 3512(a)(1) (“No provision of any of the Uruguay Round
Agreements, nor the application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, that is
inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have effect.”); id. § 3512(c)(1)(B)
(prohibiting challenges to government conduct on the ground that the conduct violates WTO
obligations).
154. A potentially difficult question would remain, however, concerning Congress’s
authority to require the state courts to provide the “review and reconsideration” mandated in
Avena. See generally Medellín Scholars’ Brief, supra note 62, at 18-26 (arguing that the
President’s order mandating state court review violated principles of federalism and judicial
independence that also apply to Congress). As Henry Hart observed a half-century ago, “[t]he
general rule, bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state control of state judicial
procedure, is that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them.” Henry M. Hart, Jr., The
Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 508 (1954). A congressional
mandate for state-court review and reconsideration in the Avena cases, notwithstanding
procedural defaults like Mr. Medellín’s failure to raise the issue at trial or on direct appeal,
would require those courts to set aside a neutral, generally-applicable procedural rule limiting
state court jurisdiction. The general rule has long been that although state courts are obligated
to hear federal claims, see Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947), that obligation does not
require them to set aside neutral, generally-applicable jurisdictional constraints, see Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 752 (1999) (describing Testa’s holding as applying to “state courts of
‘adequate and appropriate’ jurisdiction”); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 141 (1988) (holding
that federal law preempted a state notice-of-claim statute that would have barred a federal §
1983 claim, but emphasizing that the statute was not “a neutral and uniformly applicable rule of
procedure”). This problem could be avoided, however, by a statute that required federal courts
to review the Avena cases notwithstanding the petitioners’ procedural default in state court.
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responded to Avena by issuing a memorandum stating that “the
United States will discharge its international obligations under
[Avena] by having State courts give effect to the decision in
accordance with general principles of comity.”155 The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals held that this order exceeded the President’s
156
however, and the Medellín majority
constitutional authority,
157
agreed.
The non-self-executing nature of the Avena judgment was critical
to this holding about executive power; as Chief Justice Roberts
explained, “the non-self-executing character of a treaty constrains the
President’s ability to comply with treaty commitments by unilaterally
making the treaty binding on domestic courts.”158 If there were some
general principle that judgments issued under a treaty bind domestic
courts in the absence of congressional action to the contrary, then
presumably the President would have authority to “execute” such
judgments. Instead, however, the Court said that
the non-self-executing character of the relevant treaties not
only refutes the notion that the ratifying parties vested the
President with the authority to unilaterally make treaty
obligations binding on domestic courts, but also implicitly
prohibits him from doing so. When the President asserts the
power to “enforce” a non-self-executing treaty by unilaterally
creating domestic law, he acts in conflict with the implicit
understanding of the ratifying Senate.
His assertion of
authority, insofar as it is based on the pertinent non-selfexecuting treaties, is therefore within Justice Jackson’s third
159
category [from Youngstown], not the first or even the second.

155. George W. Bush, Memorandum for the Attorney General on Compliance with the
Decision of the International Court of Justice in Avena, Feb. 28, 2005, attached as Appendix 2
to Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Medellín v. Dretke,
544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04-5928). The President’s memorandum only covered “cases filed by
the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in [Avena].” Id. It thus required state courts to give effect
to Avena’s force as a judgment, not as a precedent.
At the same time that he issued this memorandum, the President also announced that the
U.S. would withdraw from the Optional Protocal consenting to ICJ jurisdiction in VCCR cases.
See Letter from Condoleezza Rice, supra note 44.
156. Ex parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
157. 128 S. Ct. at 1367-72. Justice Breyer’s dissent purported not to reach the executive
power question, but could not resist expressing considerable skepticism of the majority’s
conclusion. See id. at 1390-91 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 1371 (majority opinion).
159. Id. at 1369 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
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Medellín thus makes clear that Congress—not the President, and not
the courts—must determine when foreign and supranational
judgments will be enforced in the domestic courts of the United
States.
Finally, in light of the generally negative reaction to Medellín in
the international law community, it is worth stressing that the
Supreme Court’s refusal to give automatic binding force to a
supranational judgment, as a matter of domestic law, was completely
typical of the treatment of such judgments around the world. In
Europe, for example, judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) lack automatic domestic effect, even though they are
binding on member states of the Council of Europe as a matter of
international law.160 As in U.S. law, it is up to the legislatures of the
respective member states to determine the effect that ECHR
judgments will have in domestic courts. Indeed, these member states
are currently in the process of addressing—by statute—precisely the
issue confronted in Medellín; as Laurence Helfer reports, “[i]n 2000,
the Committee of Ministers launched an ambitious programme to
convince national governments to authorize their courts to reopen
judicial proceedings following an adverse ECtHR judgment.”161 What
these reform efforts directed at national legislatures make crystal
clear, of course, is that there is nothing unusual about Medellín’s
holding that Congress must decide whether ICJ judgments should be
enforceable in domestic courts.162

CONCLUSION
One hesitates to dismiss distinctions between “public” and
“private” international law as entirely meaningless, but I doubt that
such distinctions offer a helpful guide to the effect of supranational
judgments in domestic courts. Not only are the relevant lines difficult

160. See Laurence R. Helfer, Redesigning the ECHR: Embeddedness as a Deep Structural
Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 125, 136 (2008); Georg
Ress, The Effect of Decisions and Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the
Domestic Legal Order, 40 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 359, 374 (2005).
161. Helfer, supra note 160, at 150; see also id. (“As of 2006, such remedies are now
available in 80 per cent of member states in criminal cases and about half of the Convention
countries in civil and administrative cases.”).
162. The Medellín majority recognized as much, noting that “neither Medellín nor his amici
have identified a single nation that treats ICJ judgments as binding in domestic courts.” 128 S.
Ct. at 1363.
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to draw, but at the end of the day there is a powerful public interest in
the peaceful and efficient resolution of private disputes. I have
suggested here that the disparity between the domestic courts’
receptivity to foreign arbitral awards and their skepticism of
supranational judicial rulings in cases like Sanchez-Llamas is best
understood as a function of two variables: whether the supranational
or foreign ruling is invoked as a precedent or as a judgment, and
whether Congress has addressed by statute the effect to be given such
rulings.
These variables offer not only a descriptive explanation for what
goes on when domestic courts address supranational and foreign
rulings, but also a normative justification for the ways in which such
cases usually come out. The judgment force of a judicial ruling
invokes primarily the dispute-resolution function of courts, and in this
context, it makes sense to maximize efficiency and respect for the
agreement of the parties to the particular dispute. The precedential
force of such rulings, on the other hand, implicates the courts’ lawdeclaring function—a function in which sovereignty-based values of
accountability and coherence with domestic law play a much greater
role. These same values support the Supreme Court’s insistence, in
cases like Medellín, that Congress must have the final say concerning
the effect that domestic courts give to foreign and supranational
rulings.
The remaining question is whether this account can throw any
normative light on other aspects of our practice regarding foreign and
supranational rulings. In this brief Conclusion, I want to suggest two
areas that may warrant rethinking. The first concerns the exceedingly
narrow scope given to the “public policy” exception under the New
York Convention. Consider, for example, the RAKTA case discussed
163
in Part I, which enforced a foreign arbitral award against an
American company that had abandoned a contract to build a facility
in Egypt in the wake of the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. The American
company argued that enforcing the award would be contrary to public
policy because the United States had cut off diplomatic relations with
Egypt and withdrawn financial support for the construction project.
The Second Circuit, however, seemed to reject the notion that the
relevant “public policy” was that of the United States:
In equating ‘national’ policy with United States ‘public’ policy,
the appellant quite plainly misses the mark. To read the public
163. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
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policy defense as a parochial device protective of national
political interests would seriously undermine the Convention’s
utility. This provision was not meant to enshrine the vagaries of
international politics under the rubric of ‘public policy.’
Rather, a circumscribed public policy doctrine was
contemplated by the Convention’s framers and every indication
is that the United States, in acceding to the Convention, meant
164
to subscribe to this supranational emphasis.
This language is, quite frankly, startling: The notion that a court,
based on its reading of some legislative history indicating a strong
165
presumption in favor of arbitration, could dismiss the foreign policy
interests of the United States—in a volatile war zone, no less—as
“parochial” “vagaries of international politics” simply strains
credulity, and it is hard to imagine the Supreme Court endorsing that
extreme approach today. But perhaps the Second Circuit simply
meant that international arbitration also carries significant public
policy weight, and a substantial showing is required to overcome that
presumption.166
In any event, the important point for present purposes is that
even enforcement of judgments between two parties may interfere
with sovereign functions of law declaration—not simply of courts, but
of the national political branches as well. Courts should be cautious
in construing general statutes governing arbitration, which are
designed to settle the obligations of private parties, in such a way as
to undermine articulated governmental policies of more general
applicability. Much less should courts dismiss such policies as
“parochial” in favor of some “supranational” commitment to
arbitration. As cases like Sanchez-Llamas and Medellin have
demonstrated, American law jealously guards the prerogatives of
domestic institutions to make parochial policies in response to the
democratically-expressed desires of their constituents.

164. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Société De L’Industrie du Papier
(RATKA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974).
165. See id. at 973 (drawing the court’s reading from “the history of the Convention as a
whole” rather than from any particular text).
166. Elsewhere in its opinion, the Second Circuit did suggest that, while the bar is high, the
relevant public policy is that of the forum state and not some diffuse international community.
See id. at 974. But see Hans Smit, Comments on Public Policy in International Arbitration, 13
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 65, 65 (2002) (arguing that “i[t] was international public policy that was
decisive” in RAKTA).
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My second suggestion concerns the need for Congress to think
through its approach to supranational judgments in areas with public
law implications (however fuzzily defined). A final judgment model
works best when participants in an international regime view
settlement of particular disputes as more important than retaining
control over the content of the law going forward. For this reason,
ICJ judgments concerning the VCCR—which have become means to
167
a broader end of attacking the U.S. practice of capital punishment —
are hardly a promising candidate for supranational resolution. The
President was thus surely right to withdraw the U.S.’s consent to ICJ
jurisdiction over such cases.
On the other hand, what the President’s withdrawal—coupled
with his clumsy effort to secure state court compliance with Avena—
implicitly acknowledges is that judgments have special significance,
even when we are not prepared to acknowledge supranational
authority to definitively declare the law. Congress must ultimately
determine how supranational judgments will be enforced
domestically, but that hardly means that such judgments can be
ignored without cost, both to America’s reputation and to the rule of
law in international affairs. Congress and the President need to
extract the U.S. from supranational jurisdiction where the U.S. is not
prepared to respect the resulting judgments, and to provide a
statutory basis for domestic enforcement (subject to reasonable
exceptions as described above) where supranational jurisdiction is
retained.
The impulse to respect Avena yet prevent future
recurrences fits this twofold imperative.
It is worth noting, moreover, that Texas’s course of action in
168
executing Mr. Medellin following the Supreme Court’s ruling need
not be seen as a departure from this approach. Multiple Texas courts
had previously found, as an alternative holding, that Medellin had not
been prejudiced by the Houston police’s failure to accord him his

167. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479,
1512 (2003) (describing Mexico’s VCCR litigation as “part of a broad international-law assault
on the U.S. death penalty”).
168. See Allan Turner & Rosanna Ruiz, Medellin Executed for Rape, Murder of Houston
Teens,
HOUSTON
CHRON.,
Aug.
6,
2008,
available
at
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/front/5924-476.html.
Despite a new petition from
Medellin’s attorneys, the Supreme Court refused to halt Medellin’s execution to permit time for
legislative efforts to implement the Avena judgment. See Medellin v. Texas, 2008 U.S. LEXIS
5362 (Aug. 5, 2008). This action was unsurprising, given the highly uncertain ability of Congress
to act promptly in an election season, as well as the fact that the Texas legislature will not meet
until 2009.
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VCCR rights,169 and Texas relied on this finding to argue that the
170
Reasonable minds may differ
ICJ’s mandate had been satisfied.
over whether the Texas courts applied the correct prejudice standard
in making this finding, but because Avena did not define that
standard, Texas’s reliance on the state courts’ finding hardly amounts
to defiance of the Avena judgment. Texas’s filing before the U.S.
Supreme Court, moreover, undertook to provide the necessary
“review and reconsideration” for all other persons covered by the
Avena judgment who remained on Texas’s death row.171 Critics who
simply assert that Medellin’s execution violated Avena, without
analyzing the state courts’ prior consideration of prejudice, are far too
hasty.
In any event, it seems clear that we have progressed past the
point that questions about the domestic effect of supranational and
foreign rulings can be resolved by first principles. This is as true of
the distinction between judgments and precedents as it is of any other
dichotomy; sometimes it will make sense to accord precedential
deference to supranational rulings, and sometimes we will
appropriately resist the enforcement of supranational judgments.
Congress will ultimately have to decide in both cases, and it is high
time that legislators thought more systematically about the
172
architecture of supranational adjudication. It may be that history is
on the side of Anne-Marie Slaughter’s vision of a global “community
of courts.”173 If so, however, Congress must be the institution to build
it.

169. See supra note 59; see also Medellin, 2008 U.S. LEXIS at *2-3 (noting that “[t]he United
States has not wavered in its position that petitioner was not prejudiced by his lack of consular
access”).
170. See Respondent’s Brief in Opposition in Nos. 08-5573, 08A98, Medellin v. Texas (Aug.
4, 2008), at 13-16, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/texasbio-05-5573.pdf.
171. Id. at 17-18.
172. For an effort to provoke thought along these lines, see Ernest A. Young, Toward a
Framework Statute for Supranational Adjudication, 57 EMORY L. J. 93 (2007).
173. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 100 (2004).

